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Abstract. This paper evaluates the impact of a recent Norwegian family-policy reform on the 
labour  supply  of  native  and  three  groups  of  immigrant  women  in  Norway.  The  reform 
provides cash benefits to families with one- to three-year-old children, who do not utilize 
state-subsidized day-care centres. We find that natives and non-Western immigrants quit the 
labour market. However, the effect is trivial for natives whereas it is more significant for 
immigrants. Given participation, earnings of natives and all groups of female immigrants fell 
after the cash-benefit reform. Specifically, earnings of non-Western immigrants fell by more 
than those of natives and OECD immigrants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An important feature of Scandinavian welfare states is the transfer of resources to families 
with children. Long parental leaves and provision of high quality subsidized day care are 
important  policies  in  this  regard.  Empirical  studies  suggest  that  these  policies  have 
encouraged  labour  force  participation  of  women  with  young  children  (see,  for  instance, 
Gustafsson and Stafford 1992; Gustafsson et al. 1996; Kravdal 1996; Rønsen and Sundström 
1996; Kenjoh 2005). 
 
In the spring of 1998, the Norwegian government introduced cash benefits of up to NOK 
3,000 (approximately € 400) per month to those parents with one- to three-year-old children 
who did not utilize state-subsidized day-care facilities. This amount is roughly equivalent to 
the state subsidy per child given to day-care centres. Parents who utilize some, but not all, 
day-care facilities are entitled to receive a proportionally lower cash benefit (see Table A in 
the Appendix). The cash benefits are neither taxable nor tested against the parents’ labour-
market participation or income. It is therefore quite possible for both parents to work while 
receiving benefits. Nevertheless, these benefits increase the relative costs of child-care centres 
for  parents.  Evidence  suggests  that  high  child-care  costs  may  have  a  negative  effect  on 
married women’s labour force participation (see, for instance, Blau and Robins 1988; Chiuri 
2000; Klerman and Leibowitz 1990; Leibowitz et al. 1992; Powell 1997; Ribar 1992). 
 
A number of previous studies have compared women’s labour force participation before and 
after the cash-benefit reform of 1998. Hellevik (2000) and Rønsen (2001) report that mothers 
shifted from full-time work to part-time work following the introduction of cash benefits. 
Langset et al. (2000) estimate that the labour supply of working women with young children   3 
was reduced most in the health sector. Håkonsen (2001) finds that cash benefits reduced 
females’ professional capacity (defined as the percentage of women in the labour force) by 5 
percentage points. Schøne (2004) testifies that mothers with 1–3 year old children reduce 
labour supply by 4 percent and reduce time spent in the labour market by 3 percent. Naz 
(2004) finds that cash-benefit reform increases specialization between wives and husbands by 
3.3 hours per week. 
 
Nevertheless, all the previous studies investigate the effect of the cash-benefit reform only on 
native Norwegians; however, the number of immigrants is growing rapidly in Norway. At the 
beginning of 1990, immigrants were 4 percent of the total population but this percentage 
amounted 8.3 percent in 2006 (Statistics Norway 2006). Almost 75 percent of immigrants are 
from non-Western countries that are male-dominated societies. Their values may come into 
sharp  conflict  with  the  Norwegian  ideal  of  equality.  Even  though,  compared  with  other 
European  countries  such  as  France  and  Great  Britain,  Norway  has  proportionately  fewer 
immigrants,  immigration  and  the  new,  multi-ethnic,  nature  of  the  community  have 
nevertheless a central place in political debate. Labour force participation of non-Western 
female immigrants is quite low compared with native Norwegians and OECD immigrants. 
Integrating immigrants in the society in general and specifically in the labour market is one of 
the more important public policies. Opponents of cash-benefit reform argue that the reform of 
1998 may have had a detrimental impact on the integration of female immigrants in the labour 
market. Whether the cash-benefit reform affects the labour supply of non-Western female 
immigrants is an empirical question that we address in this paper. 
 
Using register data, we evaluate the effect of cash-benefit reform on labour supply of four 
different groups of women: native Norwegians, women from OECD countries, East European   4 
and Asian or African immigrants. We evaluate two aspects of women’s working behaviour: 
participation in the labour market and earned income given participation. Evidence suggests 
that the cash-benefit reform did not affect the wages of young children’s mothers (see Schøne 
2005). We therefore believe that a negative (positive) change in earned income of women 
because of cash-benefit reform indicates a negative (positive) change in their working hours. 
 
The  literature  on  household  economics  suggests  that  schooling  raises  earnings  and 
productivity in the market sector, which establishes a positive association between females’ 
education and their labour force participation (see, for instance, Becker 1985; Becker 1991). 
Nilsen  et  al.  (2000)  find  that  women  with  more  education,  experience,  and  income  are 
significantly less likely to quit their jobs in Norway. However, our previous findings show 
that,  because  of  the  cash-benefit  reform,  the  labour  supply  of  highly  educated  native 
Norwegian mothers fell by more than that of mothers with less education (See Naz 2004). In 
the previous paper, we used survey data collected immediately after the reform whereas in 
this paper we use register data and estimate the change in mothers’ labour supply two years 
after the reform.
1 We believe that short- and long-span responses to any type of reform may 
differ. As mothers’ education is one of the important determinants of their labour supply, we 
also investigate the effect of the reform with respect to education for natives as well as for 
immigrants. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the econometric model used to evaluate 
the effect of the reform. Section 3 reports the data sources and explains our sample. We 
examine  how  the  cash-benefit  reform  affects  labour  force  participation  and  earnings  of 
                                                 
1 In addition, in our previous paper, labour supply was measured as the number of working hours whereas, in this 
paper, we estimate participation in the labour market and the earnings of women by level of participation.   5 
women  given  participation  in  section  4.  Section  5  explains  the  empirical  findings  and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Econometric Specification 
 
We are interested in evaluating the impact of the cash-benefit reform of 1998 on labour force 
participation and earned income of native as well as immigrant mothers. For this purpose, we 
use a difference in difference estimator, as defined and specified in this section. Let Y be the 
outcome variable
2 and consider the following definitions: 
 
Yit
*= level of outcome variable for female i who has a one- to three-year-old child at time t if 
the cash-benefit reform had not been introduced; 
Yit
**= level of outcome variable for female i who has a one- to three-year-old child at time t 
after the cash-benefit reform was introduced. 
 
The difference between these two outcomes is the effect of the reform, denoted by a: 
* * *
it it Y Y - = a .                      (1) 
 
Our aim is to obtain an estimator of a, the effect of the reform. The difficulty is that we 
cannot  observe  Yit
*  directly  for  mothers  with  a  one-  to  three-year-old  child  because  cash 
benefits  have  already  been  introduced.  The  economic  literature  uses  a  wide  range  of 
estimators to address this type of evaluation problem (see, for instance, Heckman and Robb 
1985;  Moffitt  1991;  Heckman  et  al.  1999).  Here,  we  use  the  difference  in  difference 
estimator. We consider mothers with a one- to three-year-old child as a treatment group and   6 
women with a child four to six years old as a comparison group, and obtain the reform’s 
effect by estimating the difference between Yit
**and Yit
* for the treatment and comparison 
group, respectively. Consider the estimator: 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ~ * * * = - = = d Y d Y it it a ,                 (2) 
where d =1 if a woman has a child aged from one to three, and d = 0 if a woman has a child 
aged four to six years old.  1
* * = d Yit  and  0
* = d Yit  are the corresponding average values of Yit. 
 
However, the estimator defined in (2) is likely to be biased because: 
0 1
* * = ¹ = d Y d Y it it .                    (3) 
 
Even in the absence of cash benefits, the level of outcome variable for women with a child 
aged from one to three would probably differ from that of women with a child aged from 
three to six. This is mainly because females’ labour supply may vary with the age of their 
children. We can address this potential selection-bias problem by using the cohort data from 
the  pre-reform  to  the  post-reform  period.  We  use  the  following  difference  in  difference 
estimator to estimate the effect of the reform: 









* * = - - d Y Y it it  is the change in Y between the pre-reform and post-reform periods for 
the treatment group, and 0
*
1
* = - - d Y Y it it  is the corresponding change in Y for the comparison 
group. 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 The outcome labour force participation is a latent variable that takes the value of 1 if woman is employed and 0 
if she is not employed.   7 
The  identification  assumption  is  that  the  change  in  the  treatment  and  comparison  groups 
between the pre-reform and post-reform periods would have been the same in the absence of 
the reform; that is: 





* = - = = - - - d Y Y d Y Y it it it it ,                           (5) 
where t–1 is the pre-reform period and t is the post-reform period. 
 
To calculate a ˆ , we may estimate the following equation: 
e + b + b + b + b = 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 i d d d d Y ,                (6) 
where d1 = 1 if the treatment group, d1 = 0 if the comparison group, and d2 = 1 if the time 
period is after the reform; and d2 = 0 if the time period is before the reform. Substituting (6) 
into (4) we obtain the reform’s effect equal to  3 b . 
 
To determine whether the effect of the cash-benefit reform depends on women’s schooling, 
we estimate the following equation: 
v x d d x d x d x d d d d Y 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 i + g + g + g + g + b + b + b + b = ,      (7) 
where x = 1 if the education level is high (more than 12 years of schooling) and x=0 if the 
education level is low (12 or less than 12 years of schooling). The estimator of the effect of 
the reform for highly educated women is equal to 3 3 g b + . 
 
To  estimate  the  effect  of  the  cash-benefit  reform  on  earnings,  we  run  linear  regressions. 
However, to evaluate the effect of the reform on labour force participation, we run probit 
regressions as the outcome is a latent variable taking the value 1 if the woman is employed 
and 0 if she is not employed. 
   8 
3. Data and Sample 
 
Our data are extracted from the FD-Trygd database, which contains information about the 
total Norwegian population aged 16–67. The data include information from several public 
registers,  merged  by  Statistics  Norway.  The  database  is  organized  in  an  event-oriented 
fashion; i.e. records are added when an individual’s status in a register changes. It states the 
per annum income and qualification of each person and gives relatively detailed background 
information on each individual, including income, age, and education of the spouse. FD-
Trygd currently covers the period from 1992 to 2002. Our sample comprises married and 
cohabitating women. The family status of some cohabitating women may not be registered 
correctly in the data. Many cohabitating women are registered as singles. Our sample includes 
only  those  females  who  are  registered  as  cohabitants.  Most  likely,  singles  would  behave 
differently than would cohabitants; therefore, we exclude singles from our analyses as we do 
not know whether they are really singles or cohabitants. Moreover, we also intend to evaluate 
the effect of cash benefits on spouses’ (male cohabitants’) labour supply. 
 
We split our sample into treatment and comparison groups and define women with a child 
aged one to three as the treatment group and women with a child age four to six as the 
comparison group. To evaluate the effect of the reform of 1998, we form a pseudo panel of 
treatment and comparison groups and compare their labour force participation and earned 
income in the year 1997 (i.e. pre-reform period) to those in the year 2000 (i.e. post-reform 
period) as discussed in Section 2. The use of a pseudo panel enables us to control for the 
effects of childbirth and provides relatively unbiased information on the effect of the cash-
benefit reform only. A genuine panel tracks the same individuals over time, whereas a pseudo 
panel tracks cohorts/groups over time (see Deaton 1985 for details of pseudo panels). The   9 
pseudo panel of the treatment group in our sample comprises women who gave birth to a 
child either in the year 1995 or in the year 1998. The pseudo panel of the comparison group 
comprises women who gave birth to a child either in 1993 or in 1996. 
 
To define our dependent variables, i.e. market work and earnings, we use income files of the 
year 1997 and year 2000. We consider all women who had no income as non-participants in 
the  labour  market.  We  exclude  women  whose  labour  incomes  or  education  levels  were 
missing. 
 
Table 1 shows the mean values for work and education of the four groups of women and their 
spouses of our total sample.
3 The percentage of women in the labour market and percentage 
of women with higher education
4 is highest among natives and lowest among Asian-African 
immigrants. Table 1 also illustrates that, for natives and OECD immigrants, the labour force 
participation rates of the treatment and the comparison groups are almost the same in the pre-
reform  and  the  post-reform  periods.  However,  among  East  European  and  Asian-African 
immigrant women, the labour force participation of the comparison group in the post-reform 
period is much higher than that of the treatment group. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
First, we investigate the effect of the cash-benefit reform on labour market participation of 
women and thereafter on working women’s earnings, i.e. women with positive income. The 
                                                 
3 Our sample comprises married as well as cohabitating women who are registered as cohabitants. Moreover, 
registered cohabitants with children probably behave like married couples and are treated as married couples as 
far  as  public  policies  are  concerned.  Nevertheless,  we  run  separate  regressions  on  married  and  cohabitant 
women, but get similar results. Therefore, we do not differentiate between married and cohabitating couples. We 
deem that cohabitating males are husbands.   10 
mean values of education and income of working women are illustrated in Table 2. The mean 
value of income is highest for OECD immigrants and lowest for Asian-African women. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Comparing treatment and comparison groups, we see in Table 2 that mean values of income 
are not very different between these groups in the pre-reform period whereas in the post-
reform period the mean values of income of the comparison group are much higher than those 
of the treatment group. 
 
Our descriptive statistics show the negative effect of the cash-benefit reform on labour force 
participation of East European and Asian-African women and the negative effect on income 
of all working women. In the next section, we illustrate the results by running regressions to 
see whether these effects are statistically significant and how they change with respect to 
women’s schooling. Mean values of women’s labour force participation and earnings with 
respect to women’s schooling are in the Appendix (See Tables B and C). 
 
5. Regression Results 
 
Effect of Cash Benefits on Labour Force Participation 
The main objective of our research is to evaluate the impact of the reform of 1998 on natives 
as well as immigrant mothers. First, we investigate whether women stay in or quit the labour 
market because of cash benefits. For this purpose, we run separate probit regressions for 
natives and each group of immigrants. We show the marginal effects in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 More than 12 years of schooling is defined as higher education and schooling equal to or lower than 12 years is 
defined as lower education.   11 
 
We find that the reform of 1998 does not affect the labour force participation of OECD 
women  and  the  effect  on  natives  is  also  trivial.  However,  6  percent  of  non-Western 
immigrants quit the labour market because of the cash-benefit reform. Since the labour supply 
of  non-Western  immigrants  is  already  low,  the  negative  change  of  6  percent  is  quite 
significant. 
 
To  determine  whether  the  effect  on  labour  force  participation  of  the  cash-benefit  reform 
depends on the education level of women, we run probit regressions that interact with our 
independent variable with dummies for mothers’ education. Table 4 illustrates the marginal 
effects. We see that, among natives, the effect of the reform does not vary with respect to 
education level. One percent of lower as well as higher educated native women quit the labour 
market. Nevertheless, among non-Western immigrants, it is only lower educated women who 
quit the labour market after the cash-benefit reform. Inclusion of additional variables, e.g. 
dummies  of  women’s  age,  husbands’  education,  and  number  of  children  gives  us  larger 
coefficients but does not change the basic pattern of our results. 
 
Effect of Cash Benefits on Labour Market Income  
 
Given that some women remain attached to the labour market, we evaluate the effect of cash-
benefit reform on their earned income. We run regressions on log income of women, and the 
results are shown in Table 5. We see that natives as well as immigrant women’s earned 
income reduces, which indicates a decrease in working hours of women because of the cash-
benefit  reform.  It  is  women  from  non-Western  countries  who  are  more  affected.  Asian-
African women’s earnings fall by 18 percent and East Europeans’ earnings fall by 21 percent.   12 
Table 6 illustrates how the reform’s effect differs with respect to education level. For natives, 
the lower as well as the higher educated women are affected but the effect is larger for lower 
educated women. The decrease in earned income is 12 percent for lower educated and 6 
percent for higher educated native women. This result is in contrast to our previous findings 
(Naz 2004), if we presume that a decrease in earnings indicates a reduction in working hours. 
We conjecture that perhaps lower educated women required more time to respond to the cash-
benefit reform as their jobs are less flexible. 
 
Table  6  also  illustrates  that,  among  OECD  immigrants,  only  lower  educated  women’s 
earnings  fall  after  the  cash-benefit  reform  whereas,  among  non-Western  immigrants,  the 
reform affects the earnings of higher educated women. The cash-benefit reform leads to 36 
percent,  44  percent,  and  35  percent  decreases  in  earnings  of  lower  educated  OECD 
immigrants,  higher  educated  Asian-African,  and  East  European  immigrants,  respectively. 
After controlling for dummies of women’s age, husbands’ education, and number of children, 
we get slightly larger coefficients for natives and OECD immigrants and slightly smaller 
coefficients for non-Western immigrants; however, the basic pattern remains the same. 
 
We  also  ran  regressions  on  labour  force  participation  and  earned  income  of  husbands 
(cohabitants), but we did not find any statistically significant effects (therefore, we do not 
show the results). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this paper was to evaluate the effect of cash-benefit reform on women 
from different ethnic backgrounds. We estimated a change in labour market participation and   13 
earned incomes of four groups of women: natives, OECD immigrants, Asian-African, and 
East European immigrants. 
 
We find that many lower educated women from non-Western countries quit the labour market 
whereas lower educated women from OECD countries do not quit the labour market but earn 
less  after  the  cash  benefits.  As  for  natives,  they  also  have  a  greater  tendency  to  reduce 
earnings rather than to quit the labour market. 
 
The cash-benefit reform does not affect the higher educated OECD immigrants. The effect on 
higher educated natives is also small but is stronger for non-Western immigrants. We find that 
higher educated non-Western immigrants reduce their earnings, although they do not quit the 
labour market because of the reform. 
 
Our results suggest a larger and pronounced effect of the cash-benefit reform on the labour 
supply  of  non-Western  immigrants  compared  with  natives  and  OECD  immigrants.  Even 
higher  educated  non-Western  female  immigrants  behave  like  lower  educated  OECD 
immigrants. The greater effect of the cash-benefit reform on non-Western immigrants requires 
an  explanation.  We  conjecture  that  non-Western  immigrants  have  different  preferences 
compared with natives and OECD immigrants. Because of social values or lower wages in the 
labour market, non-western immigrant women may have a stronger preference for leaving the 
labour  force  to  rear  children.  The  cash-benefit  reform  increases  the  relative  price  of 
subsidized day care, which leads to a negative effect on the mothers’ labour supply for all the 
groups, but especially on the labour supply of non-Western female immigrants since they 
have a stronger preference for leaving the labour market compared with natives and OECD   14 
immigrants. However, a full analysis of the different effects of cash-benefit reform on non-
Western immigrants requires a richer data set than the one used in this paper. 
 
Even though we are unable to explain the greater effect of the cash-benefit reform on non-
Western female immigrants, our results suggest that the cash-benefit reform has a negative 
effect on integration policies that are intended to increase immigrants’ female labour force 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all women in our sample 
Variable                                  Mean 
  Child between 1-3  Child between 4-6 
  Before  After  Before   After 
Natives         
Woman works   0.86  0.87  0.86  0.88 
Husband works   0.91  0.90  0.91  0.90 
Woman’s education   0.64  0.69  0.60  0.65 
Husband’s education   0.68  0.74  0.65  0.71 
Woman’s Age  31.51  32.46  33.80  34.63 
Husband’s Age  34.17  35.02  36.52  37.27 
Married    0.82  0.80  0.85  0.87 
Number of children   2.01  2.11  2.17  2.26 
# of observations  32,090  24,229  26,749  22,350 
OECD         
Woman works   0.80  0.83  0.81  0.84 
Husband works   0.91  0.91  0.92  0.90 
Woman’s education   0.59  0.60  0.59  0.60 
Husband’s education   0.66  0.75  0.68  0.73 
Woman’s Age  32.38  33.25  34.89  35.61 
Husband’s Age  34.92  35.86  37.64  38.21 
Married    0.86  0.82  0.87  0.88 
Number of children   1.96  2.01  2.12  2.21 
# of observations  1,938  1,792  1,294  1,384 
East Europe         
Woman works   0.67  0.70  0.70  0.79 
Husband works   0.92  0.90  0.91  0.90 
Woman’s education   0.39  0.42  0.39  0.41 
Husband’s education   0.51  0.65  0.46  0.60 
Woman’s Age  30.56  32.29  32.86  34.03 
Husband’s Age  35.03  36.57  37.19  37.94 
Married    0.93  0.82  0.90  0.86 
Number of children   1.96  2.04  2.12  2.16 
# of observations  1,278  1,183  1,.001  1,063 
Asia and Africa         
Woman works   0.51  0.57  0.52  0.64 
Husband works   0.90  0.91  0.91  0.90 
Woman’s education   0.24  0.22  0.26  0.24 
Husband’s education   0.41  0.51  0.41  0.51 
Woman’s Age  30.90  31.63  33.07  33.92 
Husband’s Age  36.50  37.58  38.52  39.35 
Married    0.93  0.91  0.88  0.86 
Number of children   2.12  2.13  2.10  2.31 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for all working women in our sample 
Variable                                  Mean 
  Child between 1-3  Child between 4-6 
  Before  After  Before   After 
Natives         
Woman’s education   0.65  0.73  0.63  0.69 
Husband’s education   0.69  0.74  0.65  0.72 
Woman’s Income (NOK 100)  1 454  1 596  1 519  1 737 
Husband’s Income (NOK 100)  2770  3145  2796  3138 
Woman’s Age  31.49  32.41  33.76  34.58 
Husband’s Age  34.08  34.92  36.48  37.19 
Married    0.81  0.80  0.86  0.87 
Number of children   1.94  2.04  2.13  2.23 
# of observations  27,597  21,079  23,004  19,891 
OECD         
Woman’s education   0.65  0.63  0.65  0.60 
Husband’s education   0.69  0.74  0.68  0.74 
Woman’s Income (NOK 100)  1 628  1 780  1 607  1 878 
Husband’s Income (NOK 100)  2796  3039  2900  3165 
Woman’s Age  32.33  33.07  34.80  35.04 
Husband’s Age  34.88  35.50  37.55  37.69 
Married    0.84  0.80  0.87  0.87 
Number of children   1.88  1.92  2.09  2.16 
# of observations  1,550  1,487  1,048  1,162 
East Europe         
Woman’s education   0.48  0.46  0.46  0.43 
Husband’s education   0.56  0.65  0.53  0.62 
Woman’s Income (NOK 100)  1 358  1 475  1 407  1 608 
Husband’s Income (NOK 100)  2785  3147  2890  3147 
Woman’s Age  31.77  32.35  33.66  33.89 
Husband’s Age  35.05  36.37  37.13  37.67 
Married    0.88  0.84  0.89  0.88 
Number of children   1.95  1.95  2.04  2.06 
# of observations  856  828  707  839 
Asia and Africa         
Woman’s education   0.32  0.33  0.32  0.33 
Husband’s education   0.48  0.51  0.47  0.53 
Woman’s Income (NOK 100)  1 129  1 213  1 153  1 353 
Husband’s Income (NOK 100)  2748  3141  2940  3258 
Woman’s Age  31.06  31.42  33.28  33.41 
Husband’s Age  36.08  37.09  38.69  39.08 
Married    0.93  0.91  0.90  0.88 
Number of children   1.88  1.88  1.92  2.01 
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Table 3: Effect of cash benefits reform on women’s Labour Force Participation 
Variables  0 b   t ratio  3 b   t ratio 
         
Natives  0.23  108.51  -0.01  -2.65 
# of observations    105,418     
         
OECD  0.22  20.84  0.0002  0.01 
# of observations    6,453     
         
East Europe  0.18  12.85  -0.06  -2.20 
# of observations    4,525     
         
Asia_Africa  0.02  1.33  -0.06  -2.12 
# of observations    6,386     
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Table 4: Effect of cash benefits reform on women’s labour force participation with respect to education level 
  0 b   t ratio  0 g   t ratio  3 b   t ratio             3 g      t ratio  3 3 g b +      t ratio 
Natives                     
No control Variables  0.18  61.17  0.08  19.93  -0.01  -2.29  -0.0005  -0.06  -0.01  -2.69 
With control Variables  0.12  29.64  0.07  17.27  -0.01  -2.76  -0.002  -0.24  -0.01  -3.47 
                     
OECD                     
No control Variables  0.15  9.56  0.13  5.90  0.003  0.11  -0.01  -0.26  -0.01  -0.26 
With control Variables  0.08  3.97  0.12  5.56  -0.003  -0.11  -0.01  -0.28  -0.01  -0.51 
                     
East Europe                     
No control Variables  0.11  6.46  0.20  6.43  -0.07  -2.08  0.02  0.34  -0.05  -1.58 
With control Variables  -0.07  -2.84  0.14  4.62  -0.08  -2.36  0.02  0.31  -0.06  -1.56 
Asia_Africa                     
No control Variables  -0.02  -0.82  0.16  3.78  -0.06  -1.80  -0.04  -0.58  -0.10  -1.10 
With control Variables  -0.23  -8.31  0.14  3.34  -0.08  -2.46  0.02  -0.26  -0.06  -1.33 
                     
0 b º  constant for low education level;  0 0 g b + º  constant for high education level;  3 b º reform’s effect on low educated;  3 g º difference in the effect of the reform for low 
and high educated;  3 3 g b + º reform’s  effect on high educated. Control Variables: Dummy if Women’s age>30; Dummy if husband’s education>12 years; Dummy if 
number of children>2.   21 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of cash benefits reform on women’s Log income 
Variables  0 b   t ratio  3 b   t ratio 
         
Natives  7.01  876.9  -0.07  -4.54 
# of observations    91,571     
         
OECD  6.92  77.41  -0.15  -1.71 
# of observations    5,247     
         
East Europe  6.52  81.06  -0.21  -1.69 
# of observations    4,525     
         
Asia_Africa  6.62  98.55  -0.18  -1.75 
# of observations    6,386     
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Table 6: Effect of cash benefits reform on women’s Log income with respect to education level 
  0 b   t ratio  0 g   t ratio  3 b   t ratio             3 g      t ratio  3 3 g b +      t ratio 
Natives                     
No control Variables  6.73  540.05  0.46  28.80  -0.12  -4.37  0.06  1.84  -0.06  -3.12 
With control Variables  6.24  392.86  0.39  24.56  -0.13  -5.09  0.05  1.70  -0.08  -4.42 
                     
OECD                     
No control Variables  6.70  54.79  0.46  2.61  -0.36  -2.11  0.40  1.64  0.04  0.77 
With control Variables  6.04  42.93  0.46  2.63  -0.38  -2.25  0.44  1.79  0.06  0.32 
                     
East Europe                     
No control Variables  6.38  70.26  0.57  3.15  -0.17  -1.12  -0.27  -0.99  -0.44  -1.93 
With control Variables  5.82  51.50  0.45  2.49  -0.18  -1.20  -0.25  -0.94  -0.43  -1.94 
Asia_Africa                     
No control Variables  6.58  82.21  0.14  1.00  0.06  0.50  -0.41  -1.81  -0.35  -1.81 
With control Variables  6.31  60.88  0.12  0.88  0.05  0.42  -0.39  -1.71  -0.34  1.75 
                     
0 b º  constant for low education level;  0 0 g b + º  constant for high education level;  3 b º reform’s effect on  low educated;  3 g º difference in the effect 
 of the reform for low and high educated;  3 3 g b + º reform’s  effect on high educated. Control Variables: Dummy if Women’s age>30; 








Table A: Distribution of Cash Benefits by the Use of Subsidized Care 
Time per Week in the Day Care  Cash Benefits per month 
No Day Care  3,303 
1-8 hours  2,642 
9-16 hours  1,982 
17-24 hours  1,321 
25-32 hours  661 
>32 hours  0 






Table B: Women’s Education and Work  
Variable                                  Mean 
  Child between 1-3  Child between 4-6 
  Before  After  Before   After 
Natives         
Woman works if Education High  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.91 
Woman works if Education Low   0.79  0.78  0.81  0.83 
# of observations  32,090  24,229  26,749  22,350 
OECD         
Woman works if Education High  0.87  0.86  0.85  0.87 
Woman works if Education Low   0.70  0.76  0.72  0.78 
# of observations  1,938  1,792  1,294  1,384 
East Europe         
Woman works if Education High  0.83  0.80  0.82  0.84 
Woman works if Education Low   0.59  0.62  0.62  0.72 
# of observations  1,278  1,183  1,.001  1,063 
Asia and Africa         
Woman works if Education High  0.70  0.71  0.69  0.79 
Woman works if Education Low   0.45  0.52  0.47  0.61 
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Table C: Working Women’s Education and Income in NOK 100  
Variable                                  Mean 
  Child between 1-3  Child between 4-6 
  Before  After  Before   After 
Natives         
Woman’s income if Education High  1644  1 769  1 701  1 900 
Woman’s income if Education Low   1 124  1 193  1 175  1 319 
# of observations  27,597  21,079  23,004  19,891 
OECD         
Woman’s income if Education High  1 614  1 991  1 687  2 062 
Woman’s income if Education Low   1590  1 518  1577  1624 
# of observations  1,550  1,487  1,048  1,162 
East Europe         
Woman’s income if Education High  1 710  1 805  1 716  1 913 
Woman’s income if Education Low   972  1 174  977  1398 
# of observations  856  828  707  839 
Asia and Africa         
Woman’s income if Education High  1 473  1 615  1 456  1 774 
Woman’s income if Education Low   985  1 794  1 035  1 148 
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